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pleted unilateral contract cannot be found.' 3 Some courts, however,
have predicated their decisions squarely upon both consideration and
estoppel. 4 The first and second rationes decidendi have been utilized
in cases where all the elements of estoppel were present; nevertheless,
lip service was paid to contract principles. 15 It would appear, therefore, that unless these elements of estoppel are present there can be
no enforcement.
The court in the instant case used no ratio decidendi by name
but based its decision squarely upon the elements of estoppel. 16 This
decision may well establish a precedent for the enforcement of charitable subscriptions solely on the grounds of estoppel.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADmIssION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND' SEIZURE. - Appellant and another were con-

victed of conspiracy to commit abortion. The conviction was upheld
in the State Supreme Court although evidence was obtained by
means of an illegal search and seizure.' Appellant alleges that the
admission of this evidence was a violation of the "due process clause"
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Held, conviction sustained. The "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit admission of illegally obtained
evidence in state courts. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.25 (1949).2
justice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RE-STATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) ; Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432
(1898); Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N. W. 74

(1887).

13 1. & I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938).
14 Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941);
First M. E. Church of Mt. Vernon v. Howard, 133 Misc. 723, 233 N. Y. Supp.
451 (Surr. Ct. 1929), af'd zthout opinion, 233 App. Div. 753, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 906 (2d Dep't 1931).
151.

& I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938);

Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173 (1927) ; Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; Barnes
v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249 (1852), aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854); Central Maine
General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191, 132 Atl. 417 (1926).
16 RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 90 (1932).
In the instant case utilization
-of either the first or second ratio decidendi would have effected a new and
different agreement due to the presence of negative clause in the subscription.
1 Wolf et al. v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. 2d 926 (1947).
2But cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74 (1949), decided by the
Supreme Court the same day. There state officials secured a warrant for arrest
of petitioner, charging him with violation of a city ordinance requiring all
known criminals to register with the police. When admitted to the suspect's
rooms, they embarked on an illegal search. Uncovering evidence of counterfeiting, they called in a federal agent, who there and then examined the evidence although he did not participate in the search. Petitioner was convicted
of counterfeiting. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction ruling that ad-
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The Constitution of the United States does not prohibit a state
from establishing its own rules of evidence. 3 But it does prohibit a
state from depriving ".

.

. any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law..... ." 4 Consequently the Supreme Court
of the United States will reverse state courts whenever it finds that
they have violated the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Neither the Federal nor state constitutions define "due process
of law," 6 and the courts have declined to supply a comprehensive
definition of the phrase.7 They prefer that its full meaning should
be ascertained gradually by the process of inclusion and exclusion in
the course of decisions as they arise.3 However the Supreme Court
has declared that the "due process clause" is violated when state action is found to deny "....

fundamental principles of liberty and jus-

tice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." 9
The soundness of this doctrine is not open to question, but a difficulty
lies in applying it to the individual case. Nevertheless the Supreme
Court has utilized the concept in declaring the guarantees of the First
Amendment to be "fundamental rights." Thus the Court has condemned as unlawful state action which has abridged freedom of
speech,10 press," and the free exercise of religion.1 2 The guaranty
of the Sixth Amendment as regards benefit of counsel has also been
upheld as a fundamental right.13 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has held that the disregard of the guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment is not a violation of the fundamental rights implicit in
the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the
Court has permitted a state to abolish indictments by grand juries,' 4
mission of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment. Where there is any
federal participation in an illegal search and seizure, evidence thus obtained
must be excluded.
3 Logan and Bryan v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 157 Fed. 570 (E. D.
Ark. 1903).
'U. S. CoNsT. AmxED. XIV, § 1, reads: All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process or law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S.

86 (1923).

8 Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799
7 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Davidson

96 U. S.97 (1877).
8 Ibid.
9 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926).
10 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
11 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
.2 Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
14 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).

(1938).
v. New Orleans,
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to appeal in a criminal case where the defendant has been acquitted
by a petit jury, 15 and to allow a defendant to incriminate himself. 16
It should be noted that in federal prosecutions evidence obtained
by federal agents, by means of an unlawful search and seizure, is
excluded. 17 The reason for this exclusion is that the Fourth Amendment which prohibits the Federal Government from making unlawful
searches and seizures would be reduced ".

.

. to a form of words"

should such illegally obtained evidence help convict a defendant.' 8
However, the Federal Constitution does not specifically prohibit a
state from making unlawful searches and seizures. Consequently if
this right is to be protected against state action, it must come within
the connotation of ordered liberty inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Gouled v. United States,19 the Supreme Court in discussing
the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment stated, ".

.

. they

are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty;
and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other fundamental
rights of the individual citizen .. ." 20 And in Harris v. United
States,21 Justice Frankfurter, in referring to these rights, declared,
"Historically we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution
which sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one
single factor gave rise to American independence." 22
The instant case recognizes that the right to be protected against
unlawful searches and seizures is a fundamental right for the Court
declared, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment- is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause." 28 However the Court refused to exclude
15 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
16 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
17 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).

1s Silverthorne Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392
(1920).

19255 U. S. 298 (1921).

Here the defendant was indicted for conspiracy to

defraud the United States and for using the mails to defraud the United States.
Evidence leading to his conviction was obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure. The Court excluded the evidence, holding that admission of such evidence violates the Fourth Amendment.
20 Id. at 304.
21331 U. S. 145 (1947).
Here the defendant was indicted for having violated the Mail Fraud Statute and the National Stolen Property Act. Federal
agents armed with warrants of arrest searched defendant's apartment. The
Court held that a search incidental to an arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of the one arrested to the premises
under his immediate control. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that
to permit rummaging throughout a house without a search warrant on the
ostensible ground of looking for the instrument of a crime, when only a warrant2 2of arrest had been procured, is a serious threat to basic liberties.
Id. at 159.
23 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27, 28 (1949).
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the evidence illegally obtained on the ground that when the right to
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures is weighed against
the individual right is deemed
the public policy of suppressing 2crime,
4
to be subordinate to this policy.

It is submitted that this reasoning is both erroneous and dangerous. Since the arbitrary utilization of the power to arrest and
search is a step towards a totalitarian state, it would seem to follow
that the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment should be considered
as one of those fundamental rights protected by the "due process
clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

-

CONFESSIONS AND DUE PROCESS.-

Petitioner was convicted of murder while attempting to commit

rape. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana.'
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
reviewing the facts, found that the police, in attempting to procure
a confession from the petitioner, had questioned him for five to ten
hours on six separate days. He was kept two days in solitary confinement in a cell called "the hole." He was never given sufficient
food or rest during this period to satisfy normal needs. Petitioner
was not given a prompt preliminary hearing as required by Indiana
law; he was without friendly or professional aid and was not advised
of his constitutional rights. Held, conviction reversed. The coercive
methods employed by the police officials to elicit the confession were
unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
The Watts case was the first of three cases decided the same
day, all reversing convictions where confessions had been obtained
through coercion. 3
In reviewing cases of this nature, the Supreme Court is not
concluded by the findings of a state court that the confession was
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In coming to this conclusion the Court relied upon People v. Defore, 242
N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 586 (1926).
1 Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (1948).
2 U. S. CO,qST. AmrFND. XIV, § 1. ". . . nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .....
3 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949). The petitioner was constantly interrogated from four to six hours a day for five days. He was
denied the right to see friends or relatives and was not informed of his right
to remain silent. The suspect was not given a preliminary hearing until the
interrogation had produced a confession. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S.
68 (1949). Here the suspect was held in jail several days and on one occasion
was interrogated for a twelve-hour period. He was not given a hearing or
informed of his rights. Petitioner was denied benefit of consultation with an
attorney or friends.

